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Immanuel Kant

1724 AD — 1804 AD

Kant distinguishes good will from favourable circumstances and questions whether reason can specify a universal path to happiness. Read the contrasts between morality, prudence and imagined satisfaction through the argument.

Author and source reference ↗
▷ Play this voiceSearch within this voice ↗Place in time ↗lifeknowledgetruthtimefaithjusticemindcourage

Life and writing

The catalogue identifies Immanuel Kant with lifetime years 1724–1804 and names Thomas Kingsmill Abbott as translator of this English work. Matthew Stapleton receives the electronic preparation credit. The linked text separates sections moving from common moral knowledge toward philosophical principles. Its HTML ISBN identifies the electronic edition, not a checked original print. The related reading gives context for two archive extracts without assigning composition dates to them.

Project Gutenberg catalogue — Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals ↗Checked related reading — Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals ↗ Catalogue identity/lifetime and linked edition credits, framing or cast

The opening of the First Section argues that good will is needed for a person to be worthy of happiness and examines how advantages can be used. This is an argument about moral value, not an assertion that poverty or misfortune proves wrongdoing. In the Second Section, Kant calls happiness an ideal of imagination while explaining why empirical consequences cannot yield a definite universal rule for achieving it. He distinguishes that difficulty from the demands of duty. The passage does not simply dismiss happiness as worthless. Both selected extracts match Abbott’s checked English translation.

Checked related reading — Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals ↗ First Section; opening discussion of good will and worthiness of happiness; Second Section; happiness, imagination and prudence

Reading this voice

Read the opening discussion of good will before the contrast between happiness and duty in the Second Section. Track Kant’s use of worthiness and prudence, rather than treating favourable circumstances as proof of moral merit.

Subjects to explore

Editorial reading connections, distinct from the archive’s word matching.

A work to read

Begin with these archive passages

Editorial starting points from this author’s existing entries.

Profile sources and editorial status

Original agent-assisted editorial profile, checked 2026-10-05. No human review is recorded. Life dates are recorded to the year; they do not date individual quotations.

Archive entries

01Undated
The majesty of duty has nothing to do with the enjoyment of life. Faith ... is the moral attitude of reason as to belief in that which is unattainable by theoretical cognition. It is therefore correct to say that the senses do not err - not because they always judge rightly, but because they do not judge at all. Deficiency in judgment is just what ordinarily is called stupidity, and for such a failing there is no remedy. I have no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself. I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith. There can not be doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. The true transcendental concept of infinitude is this, that the successive synthesis of units required for the enumeration of a quantum can never be completed. Time is purely a subjective condition or our (human) intuition, (which is always sensible, that is, so far as we are affected by objects), and in itself, apart from the subject, is nothing.
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13Undated
By this freedom the will of a rational being, as belonging to the sensuous world, recognizes itself to be, like all other efficient causes, necessarily subject to the laws of causality, while in practical matters, in its other aspect as a being in itself, it is conscious of its existence as determinable in an intelligible order of things. It is conscious of this not by virtue of a particular intuition of itself but because of certain dynamic laws which determine its causality in the world of sense, for it has been sufficiently proved in another place that if freedom is attributed to us, it transfers us into an intelligible order of things."―from_Critique of Practical Reason_. Translated, with an Introduction by Lewis White Beck, p. 43.
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14Undated
We have seen, therefore, that I am not allowed even to *assume*, for the sake of the necessary practical use of my reason *God, freedom, immortality*, unless at the same time *I deprive* speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insights. Reason, namely, in order to arrive at these, must employ principles which extend only to objects of possible experience, and which, if in spite of this they are applied also to what cannot be an object of experience, actually always change this into an appearance, thus rendering all practical *expansion* of pure reason impossible. Hence I had to suspend *knowledge* in order to make room for *belief*. For the dogmatism of metaphysics without a preceding critique of pure reason, is the source of all that disbelief which opposes morality and which is always very dogmatic." ―from_Critique of Pure Reason_. Preface to the Second Edition. Translated, edited, and with an Introduction by Marcus Weigelt, based on the translation by Max Müller, pp. 25-26
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15Undated
Finer feeling, which we now wish to consider, is chiefly of two kinds: the feeling of the *sublime* and that of the *beautiful*. The stirring of each is pleasant, but in different ways. The sight of a mountain whose snow-covered peak rises above the clouds, the description of a raging storm, or Milton's portrayal of the infernal kingdom, arouse enjoyment but with horror; on the other hand, the sight of flower strewn meadows, valleys with winding brooks and covered with grazing flocks, the description of Elysium, or Homer's portrayal of the girdle of Venus, also occasion a pleasant sensation but one that is joyous and smiling. In order that the former impression could occur to us in due strength, we must have *a feeling of the sublime*, and, in order to enjoy the latter well, *a feeling of the beautiful*. Tall oaks and lonely shadows in a sacred grove are sublime; flower beds, low hedges and trees trimmed in figures are beautiful. Night is sublime; day is beautiful. Temperaments that possess a feeling for the sublime are drawn gradually, by the quiet stillness of a summer evening as the shimmering light of the stars breaks through the brown shadows of night and the lonely moon rises into view, into high feelings of friendship, of disdain for the world, of eternity. The shining day stimulates busy fervor and a feeling of gaiety. The sublime *moves*, the beautiful *charms*.
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18Undated
...[A]ll the elements which belong to the notion of happiness are altogether empirical, that is, they must be borrowed from experience, and nevertheless the idea of happiness requires an absolute whole, a maximum of welfare in my present and all future circumstances. Now it is impossible that the most clear-sighted and at the same time most powerful being (supposed finite) should frame to himself a definite conception of what he really wills in this. Does he will riches, how much anxiety, envy, and snares might he not thereby draw upon his shoulders? Does he will knowledge and discernment, perhaps it might prove to be only an eye so much the sharper to show him so much the more fearfully the evils that are now concealed from him and that cannot be avoided, or to impose more wants on his desires, which already give him concern enough. Would he have long life? Who guarantees to him that it would not be a long misery? Would he at least have health? How often has uneasiness of the body restrained from excesses into which perfect health would have allowed one to fall, and so on? In short, he is unable, on any principle, to determine with certainty what would make him truly happy; because to do so he would need to be omniscient.
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22Undated
...We find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction... even from the sciences... they find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on their shoulders rather than gained in happiness; and they end by envying rather than despising the more common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct, and do not allow their reason much influence on their conduct... [T]here lies at the root of these judgments the idea that our existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended...
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